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37 
ACTIVITY LEVELS UNDER THE HAND  
FORMULA: A COMMENT ON  
GILO AND GUTTEL 
Richard A. Epstein* † 
A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Ac-
tivity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 277 (2009). 
Introduction: The Hypnotic Hand Formula 
Within the law and economics field, there often surfaces a near hypnotic 
attraction to the Hand formula as the one and only tool that drives tort law 
toward economic efficiency. Hand’s intuition was, of course, that the test for 
efficiency requires a balancing of three variables. The burden of taking par-
ticular precautions is compared to the expected loss from some activity, 
which in turn consists of the likelihood of some particular harm multiplied 
by its anticipated severity. Liability attaches only where the burden of pre-
cautions is lower than the anticipated accident costs. By forcing cost-
effective precautions and no others on potential tortfeasors, so the story 
goes, tort law weeds out desirable from undesirable conduct. 
There are many ways to attack this myth, and I will just mention a few 
points before speaking about the ingenious contribution that David Gilo and 
Ehud Guttel offer pursuant to this orthodox tradition in their article, Negli-
gence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts.  
First, the Hand formula does not explain why it is that negligence is su-
perior to strict liability, or the reverse. As a first (and not very good) 
approximation, parties will ordinarily take as much care under the strict li-
ability rule as under the negligence rule. A pair of simplified examples 
illustrates the point.  
Suppose that the cost of care is 100, and the risk of a 200 loss is 0.6. At 
this point under both a negligence and a strict liability system, the rational 
defendant will take care. The expected loss of 120 is greater than the 100—
the cost of care. Under the negligence system, the cost of care is lower than 
the cost of the accident, so it is rational to make expenditures that avoid the 
harm. The same holds true under strict liability, which also imposes liability. 
Next, suppose that the costs of care are 120 for a probable loss of 100. The 
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defendant will not take precautions under either system. With negligence, 
the cost of prevention is too high, so there is no fear of liability from doing 
nothing. Under strict liability the losses fall on the defendant who will still 
do nothing because the 120 in prevention costs exceeds the expected loss 
from judgment. In the end, therefore, the same tipping point for corrective 
conduct applies under both systems. The only difference is that, under strict 
liability, they will be responsible for what are sometimes called inevitable 
accidents, for which the negligence rule puts the risk of loss on the plaintiff. 
An examination of second-order considerations, such as administrative 
costs, is therefore necessary to decide which rule is preferable and why.  
Second, the Hand formula poorly deals with these costs, for, as Hand 
himself recognized, the rule places enormous informational demands on 
judges and juries to estimate approximate magnitudes for these three vari-
ables after the fact.  
Third, the apparent simplicity of the formula breaks down once we leave 
the unilateral case, where, by assumption, only the defendant can take care 
to avoid the damage. Thus, the Hand formula does not apply to the frequent 
cases in which two parties independently contribute to the harm, or two par-
ties engage in cooperative efforts that sometimes result in harm. Indeed, the 
formula does not work at all on the complex issues in United States v. Car-
roll Towing,1 an admiralty case decided under a divided damage rule that 
involved three parties and an allegation of contributory negligence. The 
court never paused to ask why the owners of a barge tucked far away from 
the sea lanes owed any duty of care at all to the tug whose risky maneuvers 
damaged it.  
Fourth, unsurprisingly, the Hand formula covers, at most, that small 
sliver of the tort landscape in which there are no institutional guidelines or 
well-formed social expectations about proper standards of care. It is instruc-
tive that in their exhaustive article, Gilo and Guttel never once refer to the 
two most common sources of an obligation to take care: custom and com-
mon practice on the one hand, and statutes that dictate rules of the road or 
impose safety standards on the other.  
Fifth, the Hand formula does not cover any of the specialized rules that 
deal with important areas of tort such as bailments, medical malpractice, 
athletic injuries, occupier’s liability, and product liability. These relation-
ships are often covered by a wide range of rules that have, as I argued in my 
recent Michigan Law Review article, strong efficiency properties precisely 
because they consciously reject the cost-benefit approach of the Hand for-
mula.2 
It is against this background that it is appropriate to evaluate the distinc-
tive contribution of Gilo and Guttel’s Article, which shows, with some 
instructive numerical examples, the weaknesses of the Hand formula in 
dealing with activity levels that, as the authors argue, may be too low as 
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well as too high. The argument in the paper builds on the classic work of 
Steven Shavell,3 who showed, under the conventional economic framework, 
that the Hand formula does not lead to efficient results because it only takes 
into account the level of care conditional on entering into a given activity. 
Shavell pointed out that activity levels are also key to understanding risk 
creation. For example, drivers who travel longer than optimal distances cre-
ate more unreasonable accidents even if they exhibit the proper care levels. 
Yet so long as their care levels are appropriate, they will escape liability 
because the tort system is unable to monitor their excessive activity levels. 
Suppose it could be proved, for example, that a given defendant drove ten 
percent more often than appropriate. The actual cause in fact turns out to be 
intractable because the injured plaintiff cannot prove at trial that her injuries 
took place during a period of excessive driving. So while some cases hint 
that it may be negligent to conduct certain activities at a certain location at 
all, most courts are not keen to use the Hand formula to treat as negligent 
decisions to operate refineries, place power lines over ground, or to sell out-
door swimming pools.  
In contrast, the strict liability system does not ignore activity levels. A 
strict liability system apportions liability solely based on outputs, not inputs, 
so the plaintiff need only show the violation, say, of a rule of the road to 
recover. Care levels and activity levels are irrelevant to the trier of fact on 
the issue of liability, but will be taken into account by the actor who is sub-
ject to liability. In some unstructured environments, a plaintiff wins by 
showing that she was struck by the defendant or fell into a trap of his crea-
tion. In other more regulated environments, the touchstone of liability is 
conformity with the rules of the road. The defendant who engages in more 
activity will create more harms, all of which he will be responsible for. The 
internal corrections against excessive activity and insufficient care thus op-
erate silently in a strict liability system without placing huge informational 
demands on courts to make ex post assessments of the proper levels of ex 
ante risk. So why use the Hand formula at all in the unilateral accident cases 
analyzed by Shavell? The strict liability system adjusts to both variables in 
all cases. 
The Insufficient Activity Paradigm 
Gilo and Guttel are aware of the difficulties in using a negligence sys-
tem to deal with heightened activity levels. Their twist on the conventional 
analysis is to show, as noted above, that relying on the Hand formula can 
lead people to cut their activity down to an inefficient level in order to avoid 
the harm from the activities that result. The intuition here is consistent with 
the basic model. Gilo and Guttel assume that there is one durable precaution 
that could be taken to deal with accidents of a particular type. They then 
note that this precaution becomes cost-justified if activity levels exceed a 
certain threshold. The risk of crossing this threshold in turn results in an 
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actor’s decision to reduce activity levels so that the precaution in question 
need not be taken, which in turn means that under the Hand formula, the 
defendant is not liable in negligence for the harm caused. By using activity 
level reductions to take certain costs off his own private balance sheet, the 
defendant can create a gap between private and social welfare. There is too 
little activity from a social point of view when the defendant is no longer 
able to charge for the omitted precaution. It is worth noting that this prob-
lem also disappears with a uniform strict liability system for the class of 
unilateral accidents. The defendant still remains liable for all accidents not-
withstanding the reduced activity level, and thus does better privately by 
gearing up its activity level to the socially optimal level, whatever that may 
be. 
I have no desire to quarrel with the formal features of the authors’ analy-
sis under the Hand formula. But there is good reason to doubt whether this 
chink in the Hand formula’s armor—the incentive for defendants to perform 
at insufficient activity levels—is one that has any institutional clout. The 
first question one might ask is whether any defendant has ever explicitly 
relied on this defense in order to escape liability. Of the many cases Gilo 
and Guttel present in their Article, none includes such a defense. Let me just 
mention two of them. Donovan v. Castle & Cooke Foods4 raises many inter-
esting questions of administrative law under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, which imposes duties on employers to take feasible steps to se-
cure worker safety. But the case was not a tort action at all, and the word 
negligence was never mentioned in the opinion, which only addressed the 
perennial question of the level of deference that courts show to administra-
tive agencies in overseeing a statute.  
Similarly, Spagnulo v. Com., Dept. of Environmental Management5 was 
a personal injury action brought when the plaintiff was injured when he fell 
off a set of bleachers the defendant maintained at a hockey match. But this 
case was brought under Massachusetts’s recreational use statute, which re-
quired proof of recklessness for the cause of action to go forward. The case 
says nothing about how a negligence system should work, nor does it give 
any hint that these bleachers were somehow involved in low-level activities. 
The key question for all of the Hand theorists is why these recreational stat-
utes are widely regarded as a necessary exception to the any negligence 
formula. 
The absence of cases that actually talk about the problem of insufficient 
activity levels is instructive. Priors really matter. There is an old saying in 
medical diagnosis that when you hear a herd of animals rushing down the 
Great Plains, think horses not zebras. The underactivity defense strikes me 
as all zebra and no horse. The first point is a simple matter of ginning up 
credible numbers to make out the factual underpinning for this claim. In 
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most American jurisdictions, the jury decides questions of negligence. And 
in the absence of clear error, those determinations are left undisturbed. The 
kinds of mistakes that Gilo and Guttel illustrate show at most ten percent 
deviations from the ideal, which are just too small to matter. The examples 
all presuppose that the information problems have been solved, so that we 
have perfect point estimates for all the relevant variables in all relevant 
states of the world. But once we introduce any error term into the mix, the 
point estimates will become ranges, and these ranges will mean that at least 
some estimates for the relevant parameters will falsify, not reinforce, the 
underactivity hypothesis. I cannot believe that any defendant would prefer 
to make this explicit defense when a straightforward denial of negligence by 
showing high care and low risk is available.  
There are also more conceptual problems. Gilo and Guttel posit a situa-
tion in which the total activity level for the relevant period is known at trial. 
But how do we know what this is? We can only assume that early on within 
some relevant period, the defendant commits some action that will cause 
harm. How does he establish that he has planned to engage only in a limited 
amount of the activity in question, such that the proposed new precautions 
need not be taken? The unfortunate incident could have happened anywhere 
in the cycle, so it is doubtful that any judge or jury would accept the self-
serving statement that the defendant should be excused because he had no 
intention to engage in high levels of activity in the first place. 
The implausibility of the underactivity defense is heightened, moreover, 
once we wean ourselves from the illusion that the Hand formula describes 
the way in which tort law works. In many instances, the Hand formula 
yields to particular statutes or customs in regulated activities. These other 
formulations leave no opening for the underactivity defense. For example, 
the doctrine of negligence per se, which provides that statutory violations 
create rebuttable presumptions of negligence, is widely adopted. There is 
the occasional case in which an unanticipated epileptic fit could be suffi-
cient to allow the defendant (or plaintiff) to escape a finding of negligence 
for breach of a statutory obligation. But I know of literally no case that lets 
the negligence per se rule be undermined by a generalized cost benefit 
analysis of the sort that Gilo and Guttel recommend. Thus once the focus is 
put on whether the defendant (or plaintiff) has run a red light, no one cares 
whether he drives lots of time or not at all. Assuming the presence of causa-
tion, the statute trumps any cost benefit analysis, and so eliminates all 
references to either care or activity levels. At this point, the system starts to 
converge on a strict liability system, where all that matters is deviation from 
the applicable norm.  
The use of this approach also makes it easier to deal with cases where 
two or more actors contribute to the harm. Two variations matter: First, the 
same negligence per se rule that applies to the defendant’s conduct will also 
test any plaintiff’s independent breach of a statutory duty. Doctrines of con-
tributory or comparative negligence link the defendant’s breaches with the 
plaintiff’s breaches to determine liability. Therein lies no pretext that these 
rules can actually induce efficient behavior—it is simply a question of 
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cleaning the dockets in small cases. Second, if the plaintiff’s deviation from 
the norm was in response to the defendant’s perceived deviation, the usual 
negligence per se approach is displaced. Under this approach, the inquiry is 
whether the plaintiff under stress did her best to minimize the risk by taking 
action that is neither rash nor foolish. These variations represent a two-fold 
deviation from the Hand formula—the first veers toward strict liability and 
the second toward intentional torts. In neither setting does anyone explicitly 
address activity levels. 
A similar analysis applies to medical cases governed by the usual cus-
tomary standards of due care. No surgeon can defend himself by saying he 
did not need extensive training because he only operates once in a blue 
moon. He must still meet the customary standards within the field, or turn 
the case over to someone who can. It is widely known that medical and sur-
gical errors are reduced with practice and experience. This is why clinics 
that do a low volume of work in any practice area still pay high insurance 
premiums. The law always provides exceptions to negligence liability for 
emergency situations, and it contains additional rules to adjust the standard 
of care for community hospitals with fewer resources and less sophisticated 
doctors. These rules on hospital liability, however, have not evolved in re-
sponse to any concern with activity levels. Rather, they represent how 
practical knowledge influences the shape of tort law in ways that Gilo and 
Guttel ignore in their discussion of the supposedly all-purpose Hand for-
mula.  
Gilo and Guttel’s failure to account for the medical cases in their Article 
also highlights another issue: the lack of differentiation between the two 
accounts of “care” that exist in tort law. These accounts carry with them 
very different connotations. The first is to take care to steer clear of a 
stranger. The second is to render care or assistance to another particular hu-
man being pursuant to a voluntary relationship. Together, these axioms 
present a problem for Gilo and Guttel’s model: voluntary relations are far 
more complex than they acknowledge, because the patient is virtually al-
ways willing to accept some degree of risk in treatment in exchange for the 
reduction of other greater risk. Conversely, there is no need for any stratifi-
cation of care levels on highways, which is why the rules of the road take on 
a categorical form. But it is not sensible to assume that the physician or sur-
geon would agree to meet levels of care that they do not have the equipment 
or training to reach. So “tort” law now acts like contract law in disguise, 
fashioning different levels of care to reflect the very different circumstances 
on which care is provided. These local variations may move a standard of 
care in one direction or another, but they bear no relationship to the problem 
that Gilo and Guttel flag in their Article—i.e., getting the benefit of lower 
care standards by lowering the frequency of surgery or other forms of treat-
ment. Indeed, the whole point of the particular rules is to avoid getting 
enmeshed in the difficult calculations of care levels under the Hand formula. 
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Conclusion: The Risks of Overgeneralization 
There is a more general lesson that can be learned from Gilo and Gut-
tel’s Article: there are two ways to study tort law. The first way is to create 
formally conceived models to deduce the efficiency or inefficiency of the 
current rules. My own sense is that this approach has limited utility because 
it ignores the wide variations in institutional contexts that give tort law its 
richness. The great danger here is that modelers start looking for problems 
that have never bubbled to the surface in the case law. The alternative 
method treats the cases and the statutes as raw materials of the system that 
then direct theoretical inquiry, which works because it rests on a strong de-
scriptive basis generated by a huge number of cases each with its own rich 
factual pattern.  
I think that a closer attention to these patterns would have hinted to Gilo 
and Guttel (and to many others in the law and economics movement) the 
limitation of abstract conceptions. Quite simply, the Hand formula only 
touches a small fraction of the case and statutory law that regulates tortious 
conduct. It takes a systematic disregard of the vast body of law to conclude 
otherwise. Once the Hand formula is relegated to its proper place as a back-
up consideration when all else fails, the landscape changes. In some con-
texts, such as road accidents, much of the difference between strict liability 
and negligence disappears through the invocation of the doctrine of negli-
gence per se, and aided in other contexts by the use of res ipsa loquitur. Yet 
at the same time, the rise of customary standards in medical malpractice 
pushes the law away from the Hand formula in the opposite direction—by a 
reliance on practices developed within the industry when a strict liability 
system imposes inordinate costs that cannot be borne out of the revenues 
collected from the patients it treats. Similar variations take place with ath-
letic injuries and occupier’s liability, where often recklessness standards 
prevail. Product liability cases vary all over the lot, with different considera-
tions for construction, design and warning cases. 
This dispersion shows that for all its allure, the Hand formula loses out 
pretty much across the board, as it should. Hand himself never claimed that 
much for his bit of algebra. Indeed, he used the formula not to unify the law 
of torts, but to explain why it tended to resist theoretical unification. But his 
caution has been thrown to the wind by economists who make the assump-
tion that efficiency requires a case by case analysis of the facts and 
circumstances of each case.  Rather, the better use of the formula is as a 
guide to the formulation of sensible rules—not expressed in cost/benefit 
terms that can be used for discrete categories of cases, Of course, overall 
efficiency is a laudable goal for the tort system. But an unmoored cost-
benefit analysis is not the way to reach it, whether we look at care levels, 
activity levels, or both. Gilo and Guttel have added a novel brick on a road 
that runs unfortunately in the wrong direction, toward greater, unnecessary 
formalism. 
